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The G20 has served its purpose and should be replaced with
a Global Economic Council on a firmer constitutional
foundation
Robert Wade and Jakob Vestergaard argue that by permanently excluding 172 countries,
the G20 deprives the large majority of nations of voice on matters that may crucially affect
them. They believe it should be replaced by a Global Economic Council (GEC) based on a
delegated voting system, and here they provide details of what this might look like.
In 1999, in the wake of  the East Asian f inancial crisis, the US Treasury and the German
f inance ministry chose another 12 states to join the existing G7 as a new G20 of
“systemically important” countries to f orge agreements on global economic and f inancial
issues. Otherwise, as the G7 states calculated, they would be like the captain of  a ship
who stands at the wheel moving it f rom side to side, knowing that the wheel was not
connected to the rudder. Of  the newcomers, 11 were developing countries. So the
f ormation of  the G20 represented a signif icant expansion of  country representation at
the top table of  global economic governance.
In 2008, in the wake of  the Great Crash, US president George Bush convened a summit
of  the heads of  government of  the same G20
countries to f orge agreements on how to handle the
gathering crisis. Since the Washington meeting the
G20 leaders have met six t imes (London, Pittsburgh,
Toronto, Seoul, Cannes, and most recently in Los
Cabos, Mexico, June 2012) all in hopes of
institutionalising global macroeconomic and f inancial
coordination.
The G20 now has enough of  a track record f or its
perf ormance to be judged. Beyond an early
coordination of  Keynesian stimulus it has achieved
remarkably litt le, whether on ref orm of  the
international monetary system (f or example, to
dampen large exchange rate misalignments driven by
speculation), or ref orm of  the international f inancial system (Martin Wolf  of  the Financial Times
described the Basel 3 agreement on bank capital adequacy as “a mouse”), or even voice ref orm at the
Bretton Woods organisations. Most of  the big member states have become distinctly luke-warm about
its continuing utility. A Financial Times headline at the time of  the Seoul summit in November 2010 said
that the G20 demonstrated “how not to run the world”. (See: J. Vestergaard and R. Wade, “The G20 has
served its purpose and should be replaced”, Journal of  Globalization and Development.)
But the problem is not just on the “outputs” side. The organisation also lacks legit imacy on the “inputs”
side, in the sense that the membership cannot be “reverse engineered” f rom any f ormula of  “systemic
importance”; or to put the point more generally, the membership does not meet widely accepted criteria
of  representation. It is not clear by what possible criteria Argentina or Australia might be deemed
“systemically important”.
By permanently excluding 172 countries f rom participating in “the premier f orum f or our international
economic cooperation”, as it describes itself , the G20 reinf orces a trend towards “multilateralism of  the
big” (MOB). This deprives the large majority of  nations of  voice on matters that may crucially af f ect them.
The G20 has tried to sof ten its exclusivity by incorporating the European Union as one of  the 20 and by
invit ing the Af rican Union and ASEAN to send representatives. But the representatives of  these regional
organisations participate more as observers than as decision-makers.
The absence of  explicit membership criteria not only de- legit imises the current membership, it also
undermines the G20’s ability to remain relevant in a shif t ing global economy. In addition, the G20
undermines the existing, well-established system of  multilateral cooperation in organisations such as the
IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations. Representatives of  G20 countries who sit in governing
positions in these bodies can and do shut their ears when representatives of  non-G20 countries speak,
knowing that the latter don’t count. We argue that the G20 be replaced by a Global Economic Council
(GEC) based on a delegated voting system. Specif ically, the GEC should be based on a ref ormed version
of  the constituency system of  the Bretton Woods organisations (the IMF and the World Bank).
It might look as f ollows:
First, all member states of  the Bretton Woods organisations are members of  the GEC and are grouped
into 25 country constituencies. Each constituency has a seat at the top table but unlike the present
Bretton Woods constituency system all constituencies contain multiple countries.
Second, heads of  government of  each constituency should meet at least twice a year, af ter prior
consultation in their constituencies. Likewise f inance ministers and f oreign ministers and other sectoral
ministers should meet as well.
Third, states have voting power in proportion to their share of  world GDP, in place of  the current Bretton
Woods practice of  bringing an ad hoc range of  non-GDP criteria into the allocation of  voting power,
partly with the covert objective on the part of  over-represented states of  def erring their loss of  voting
power. In the 2010 voting ref orms in the World Bank, some states managed to retain their existing voting
share by insisting on new criteria, such as promises of  f uture f inancial contributions to the sof t- loan arm
of  the Bank.
Fourth, of  the 25 seats, 16 are distributed evenly among the world’s f our main regions (Af rica, Americas
and Australasia, Asia, and Europe). The remaining nine seats are allocated to the regions in proportion to
their share of  world GDP. This currently gives all regions except Af rica three more seats. In total, Af rica
has f our seats and the other three regions seven seats each.
Fif th, within regions seats are allocated to country constituencies f ormed on the basis of  negotiations in
which countries’ voting power is proportional to GDP. No constituency is smaller than three countries.
Each constituency has one executive director and two deputies, and decides internally whether to have
rotation at both levels or only at the level of  deputies. Flexibility in rotation modality would allow
heavyweights like the US and China to maintain their seat at the top table, while ensuring rotation and
consultation via the deputies.
Sixth, the constituencies of  the IMF and World Bank are made congruent with those of  the GEC.
This system of  global economic governance has several advantages on the “inputs” side: It boosts the
representation of  the 172 states which are not represented or barely represented in the current G20; It
strengthens organisation at the regional level; And it provides long-term durability to global economic
governance by responding to the rise and f all of  nations and regions through a transparent,
automatically updated system of  weighted voting based on GDP.
As f or its mandate (the “outputs” side), it should exercise stewardship of  the Bretton Woods
organisations, including by appointing their heads — in place of  the present opaque non-system
dominated by the US and the European Union. Arguably it should appoint the heads of  all organisations
in the UN f amily. With such powers its members would certainly take their membership responsibilit ies
seriously, as most of  them currently do not. Repeated interaction might – to be optimistic – enable it to
reach agreements not only on prisoner ’s dilemma-type problems, where the parties agree on the nature
of  the problem, but also where the parties start of f  with basic disagreements on the nature of  the
problem (about exchange rates, climate change, etc.).
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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